Medtronic will not be developing a product update to address cleartext transmission of sensitive information and authentication bypass by capture-replay vulnerabilities in its MiniMed 508 Insulin Pump, according to a report with NCCIC
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities, discovered by Billy Rios, Jesse Young, and Jonathan Butts of Whitescope LLC, may allow an attacker to replay captured wireless communications and cause an insulin (bolus) delivery. This is only possible when non-default options are configured. Additionally, the pump will annunciate this by providing a physical alert, and the user has the capability to suspend the bolus delivery.
The following supported Medtronic products suffer from the vulnerabilities:
• MMT – 508 MiniMed insulin pump
• MMT – 522 / MMT – 722 Paradigm REAL-TIME
• MMT – 523 / MMT – 723 Paradigm Revel
• MMT – 523K / MMT – 723K Paradigm Revel
• MMT – 551 / MMT – 751 MiniMed 530G
In one vulnerability, communications between the pump and wireless accessories are transmitted in cleartext. A sufficiently skilled attacker could capture these transmissions and extract sensitive information, such as device serial numbers.
CVE-2018-10634 is the case number assigned to this vulnerability, which has a CVSS v3 base score of 4.8.
In addition, the models identified above, when paired with a remote controller and having the “easy bolus” and “remote bolus” options enabled (non-default), are vulnerable to a capture-replay attack. An attacker can capture the wireless transmissions between the remote controller and the pump and replay them to cause an insulin (bolus) delivery.
CVE-2018-14781 is the case number assigned to this vulnerability, which has a CVSS v3 base score of 5.3.
The products see use mainly in the healthcare and public health sectors. They see action on a global basis.
No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are not exploitable remotely. High skill level is needed to exploit.
Ireland-based Medtronic will not be developing a product update to address these vulnerabilities. If a user has never programmed or used a remote controller, they are not susceptible to this attack. Additionally, if the user disables the remote option or turns off the easy bolus option in their pump, they are not susceptible to this attack.
The easy bolus and remote options are turned off in the pump by default. In cases where users want to continue to use the convenience of the remote controller, as a precaution to this attack, Medtronic recommends the easy bolus is turned off when they are not intending to use remote bolus option; and when the easy bolus option is turned on, be attentive to pump alerts.
Medtronic has released additional patient focused information.
Additionally, Medtronic will be sending a letter to all the patients who have acquired these remote controllers over the past four years to inform them about the security risks and compensating controls.