Schneider Electric updated its fix for its Triconex Tricon, Model 3008 that suffered from improper restriction of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer vulnerability, according to a report from NCCIC.
This updated advisory is a follow-up to the original advisory that was published last month.
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could misinform or control the safety instrumented system which could result in arbitrary code execution, system shutdown, or the compromise of safety systems.
A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) MP Model 3008 firmware versions 10.0-10.4 suffer from the remotely exploitable vulnerability.
In the vulnerability, system calls read directly from memory addresses within the control program area without any verification. Manipulating this data could allow attacker data to be copied anywhere within memory.
CVE-2018-8872 is the case number assigned to this vulnerability, which has a CVSS v3 base score of 9.0.
In addition, when a system call is made, registers are stored to a fixed memory location. Modifying the data in this location could allow attackers to gain supervisor-level access and control system states.
CVE-2018-7522 is the case number assigned to this vulnerability, which has a CVSS v3 base score of 7.9.
The product sees use in multiple sectors across a worldwide geographic footprint.
Click here for the Schneider Electric security notification.
Triconex users should contact their local Schneider Electric office for assistance. With this engagement, Schneider Electric will gather data from each Tricon safety system installation, analyze for the presence of the malware and carry out any necessary malware removal procedures.
For users who choose to gather data from each Tricon safety system installation on their own, instructions and support material is available for download via the Schneider Electric Process Automation customer support portal. The data will still need to be sent to Schneider Electric for analysis.
Once Schneider Electric has analyzed this data, Triconex users will receive a report for each Tricon system analyzed. This report will advise whether the malware was detected, and what the next steps are to remove the malware if detected.
A YARA rule that matches the binary components of the HatMan malware is available for download or by contacting Schneider Electric Customer Support.
The HatMan malware requires unrestricted access to the safety network via remote network or physical access. Additionally, the malware requires the Tricon key switch to be in the “PROGRAM” mode to successfully deploy its payload.
Schneider Electric continues to recommend users always implement the instructions in the “Security Considerations” section in the standard Triconex documentation (i.e., Planning and Installation Guides and TriStation 1131 Developers Guide), which include the following:
• Ensure the cybersecurity features in Triconex solutions are always enabled
• Safety systems must always be deployed on isolated networks
• Physical controls should be in place so that no unauthorized person would have access to the safety controllers, peripheral safety equipment, or the safety network
• All controllers should reside in locked cabinets and never be left in the “PROGRAM” mode
• All TriStation engineering workstations should be secured and never be connected to any network other than the safety network
• All methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated safety network such as CDs, USB drives, DVD’s, etc. should be scanned before use in the TriStation engineering workstations or any node connected to this network
• Laptops and PCs should always be properly verified to be virus and malware free before connecting to the safety network or any Triconex controller
• Operator stations should be configured to display an alarm whenever the Tricon key switch is in the “PROGRAM” mode
HatMan malware specifically targets these vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are exploitable remotely. High skill level is needed to exploit.