Researchers are calling this vulnerability BLURtooth.
As detailed in the Bluetooth Core Specification versions 4.2 and 5.0, Bluetooth CTKD can end up used for pairing by devices that support Low Energy (BLE) and Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate (BR/EDR) transport methods, known as “dual-mode” devices, researchers said.
Several potential attacks could end up performed by exploiting CVE-2020-15802, including a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack. Researchers are calling the vulnerability BLURtooth and the group of attacks BLUR attacks, CERT-CC researchers said. Vulnerable devices must permit a pairing or bonding to proceed transparently with no authentication, or a weak key strength, on at least one of the BR/EDR or LE transports in order to be susceptible to attack. It may be possible to pair with certain devices using JustWorks pairing over BR/EDR or LE and overwriting an existing LTK or LK on the other transport. When this results in the reduction of encryption key strength or the overwrite of an authenticated key with an unauthenticated key, an attacker could gain additional access to profiles or services that are not otherwise restricted, researchers said.
The Bluetooth SIG released recommendations for mitigating this issue that include additional conformance tests to ensure the overwrite of an authenticated key or a key of a given length with an unauthenticated key or a key of reduced length ends up not permitted in devices supporting Bluetooth Core Specification version 5.1 or greater. They also recommend potentially vulnerable implementations introduce the restrictions on CTKD mandated in Bluetooth Core Specification versions 5.1 and later.
Implementations should disallow overwrite of the LTK or LK for one transport with the LTK or LK derived from the other when this overwrite would result in either a reduction of the key strength of the original bonding or a reduction in the MitM protection of the original bonding (from authenticated to unauthenticated). This may require the host track the negotiated length and authentication status of the keys in the Bluetooth security database.
Bluetooth SIG further recommends devices restrict when they are pairable on either transport to times when user interaction places the device into a pairable mode or when the device has no bonds or existing connections to a paired device. In all cases, it is recommended that devices restrict the duration of pairing mode and overwrite an existing bonding only when devices are explicitly in pairing mode.

