Entergy Operations Inc. is facing a $150,000 fine for three willful violations of nuclear agency requirements at the River Bend nuclear power plant. Entergy operates the plant in St. Francisville, Louisiana.

The investigations by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated on April 6, 2020; April 7, 2020; and May 14, 2020, and were completed on February 3, 2021; March 30, 2021; and March 2, 2021, respectively.

The violations from the NRC involved:

On Aug. 13, 2018, a proctor made an unauthorized copy of an exam after thinking he had lost pages of the exam taken by the examinee. He then falsified answers on behalf of the examinee and submitted it.

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A Level III nondestructive examination (NDE) proctor administered a general MPE to a Level II NDE inspector (examinee). After proctoring the exam, the Level III NDE proctor misplaced several pages of the magnetic particle examination (MPE) exam taken by the examinee. The Level III NDE proctor created an unauthorized duplicate copy of the exam, and then deliberately falsified an MPE exam on behalf of the examinee and submitted the falsified MPE exam to the Principal Level III NDE Inspector for grading.

During an interview with the Office of Investigations Special Agent, the Level III NDE proctor admitted that he had falsified the second MPE exam to cover-up the fact that he had lost the original exam and submitted a falsified exam for grading. Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, it appears that the Level III NDE proctor deliberately copied and re-created an MPE exam on behalf of an examinee and deliberately submitted the falsified exam to the licensee for grading. This appears to have caused the licensee to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

On Sept. 1, 2019, a non-licensed operator assigned to the plant’s control building failed to properly complete a tour of all areas as required. On September 1, 2019, the operator over-instruction (OI) and the operator under-instruction (UI) conducted operator rounds of the control building. Prior to the operator rounds, the operations shift manager placed a bright yellow placard on unit alarm (UA) panel 650 for audit purposes. As part of the control building operator rounds, watchstanders are required to check UA panels 250, 425, and 650.

During the performance of the control building operator rounds, the OI and the UI stopped near a filter train in the control building where the UI asked the OI numerous questions about the filter train. The OI told the UI that they needed to keep moving and walked away towards the next inspection area, UA panels 250, 425, and 650. As the OI walked past the UA panels, he pointed with his left hand towards the UA panels and turned his head to the right and said out loud, “250, 425, 650 panel checks.” The OI neither observed the panels nor took the readings for the UA panels, and therefore, the OI did not observe the yellow placard attached to UA panel 650. Assuming that the OI calling out the panel numbers was the OI confirming that he had checked the panels, the UI entered the readings for those panels into the handheld device as satisfactorily completed. The UI skipped panels 250, 425, and 650 and neither observed them nor took readings from them. The OI did not question the UI on whether he conducted the UA panel checks, and the UI did not ask the OI if he had completed the panel checks.

On March 31, 2020, a senior reactor operator provided a key to a maintenance supervisor who was not authorized to receive it and the supervisor accessed a room containing cybersecurity-related equipment. licensed, employed by Entergy Operations Inc. at the River Bend Station, willfully gave a access key to an unauthorized individual. The investigation was completed on March 2, 2021.

In the incident, a work week senior reactor operator (SRO) checked out, to himself, a key that controls access to a room with critical digital assets (CDA) and then gave the key to a mechanical maintenance supervisor.

The SRO did this knowing the maintenance supervisor was not a member of the critical group that authorized him to possess CDA physical access keys and that giving him the key was a violation of licensee Procedure EN-IT-103-07, “Cyber Security Physical Access Requirements for Critical Digital Assets.” During an interview with the Office of Investigations Special Agent, the SRO indicated that schedule pressure to accommodate the performance of maintenance influenced the decision to give the key to an unauthorized individual. The SRO also indicated during testimony that he was aware of the requirement to only give CDA physical access keys to those authorized to possess them and that he gave a CDA physical access key to an unauthorized individual in spite of this knowledge.

Based on the evidence developed during the investigation, it appears that a work week SRO checked out a CDA access key and deliberately gave it to an individual who was not authorized to possess this key.

NRC staff met with company representatives virtually on Aug. 16 during a pre-decisional enforcement conference to discuss the violations as described in a July 1 inspection report.
The company has 60 days to dispute the fine or request involvement of a neutral third-party mediator to resolve the issues.

Click here for more information on the investigations.

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