In typical Conti ransomware attacks, malicious cyber actors steal files, encrypt servers and workstations, and demand a ransom payment, said officials at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
To secure systems against Conti ransomware, CISA, FBI, and the National Security Agency (NSA) recommend implementing the mitigation measures described in this Advisory, which include requiring multi-factor authentication (MFA), implementing network segmentation, and keeping operating systems and software up to date.
While Conti is considered a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model ransomware variant, there is variation in its structure that differentiates it from a typical affiliate model, according to the advisory. It is likely Conti developers pay the deployers of the ransomware a wage rather than a percentage of the proceeds used by affiliate cyber actors and receives a share of the proceeds from a successful attack.
Conti actors often gain initial access to networks through:
- Spearphishing campaigns using tailored emails that contain malicious attachments or malicious links: Malicious Word attachments often contain embedded scripts that can end up used to download or drop other malware — such as TrickBot and IcedID, and/or Cobalt Strike — to assist with lateral movement and later stages of the attack life cycle with the eventual goal of deploying Conti ransomware.
- Stolen or weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials
- Phone calls
- Fake software promoted via search engine optimization
- Other malware distribution networks (e.g., ZLoader)
- Common vulnerabilities in external assets
In the execution phase, attackers run a getuid payload before using a more aggressive payload to reduce the risk of triggering antivirus engines, according to the advisory. CISA and FBI have observed Conti actors using Router Scan, a penetration testing tool, to maliciously scan for and brute force routers, cameras, and network-attached storage devices with web interfaces. Additionally, actors use Kerberos attacks to attempt to get the Admin hash to conduct brute force attacks.
Conti actors are known to exploit legitimate remote monitoring and management software and remote desktop software as backdoors to maintain persistence on victim networks. The actors use tools already available on the victim network — and, as needed, add additional tools, such as Windows Sysinternals and Mimikatz — to obtain users’ hashes and clear-text credentials, which enable the actors to escalate privileges within a domain and perform other post-exploitation and lateral movement tasks. In some cases, the actors also use TrickBot malware to carry out post-exploitation tasks.
According to a recently leaked threat actor “playbook,” Conti actors also exploit vulnerabilities in unpatched assets, such as the following, to escalate privileges and move laterally across a victim’s network:
2017 Microsoft Windows Server Message Block 1.0 server vulnerabilities
“PrintNightmare” vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527) in Windows Print spooler service
“Zerologon” vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) in Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller systems
Artifacts leaked with the playbook identify four Cobalt Strike server Internet Protocol (IP) addresses Conti actors used to communicate with their command and control (C2) server.
- 162.244.80[.]235
- 85.93.88[.]165
- 185.141.63[.]120
- 82.118.21[.]1
CISA and FBI observed Conti actors using different Cobalt Strike server IP addresses unique to different victims.
Conti actors often use the open-source Rclone command line program for data exfiltration. After the actors steal and encrypt the victim’s sensitive data, they employ a double extortion technique in which they demand the victim pay a ransom for the release of the encrypted data and threaten the victim with public release of the data if the ransom is not paid.
CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise:
- Use multi-factor authentication
- Implement network segmentation and filter traffic
- Scan for vulnerabilities and keep software updated
- Remove unnecessary applications and apply controls
- Implement endpoint and detection response tools
- Limit access to resources over the network, especially by restricting RDP
- Secure user accounts
- Use the Ransomware Response Checklist in case of infection
Click here for more on the advisory.

