The attackers deployed a previously unknown rootkit called Moriya, which allows attackers to intercept network traffic and conceal malicious commands issued to the infected hosts, said researchers at Kaspersky. This led to the attackers secretly controlling the networks of the targeted organizations for several months.
Rootkits are malicious programs or collections of software tools that give attackers practically unlimited and covert access to an infected computer. Rootkits end up known for stealth and evasion due to their ability to blend into the fabric of the operating system.
This enabled attackers to avoid detection by security solutions.
Secondly, the rootkit did not reach out to any server to request commands, as is the case for most common backdoors, but rather received those in specially marked packets, blended in with the bulk of network traffic the malware inspected. The rootkit thereby avoided the need to maintain a Command and Control infrastructure, hindering analysis and making the activity harder to trace.
Moriya deployed through a compromise to vulnerable web servers within the targets’ organizations. In one case, the attackers infected a server with the China Chopper webshell, a malicious code allowing remote control of the infected server. Using the access obtained with that webshell, the Moriya rootkit was deployed.
Additionally, a set of various tools – tailor-made or previously seen in use by various Chinese-speaking actors, was employed alongside the rootkit, which allowed the attackers to scan hosts in the local network, find new targets, and perform a lateral movement to spread to them and exfiltrate files.
“While we were not able to attribute the campaign to a specific actor, both targets and tools used in the APT have a connection to known Chinese-speaking groups, thereby pointing to the actor likely also being Chinese-speaking,” said Giampaolo Dedola, senior security researcher at Kaspersky’s Global Research and Analysis Team. “We also found an older version of Moriya used in a stand-alone attack in 2018, which points to the actor being active since at least 2018. The targets’ profile and leveraged toolset suggest that the actor’s purpose in this campaign is espionage, though we can only partially attest to this with lack of visibility into any actual siphoned data.”
“As we continue to gear up and better defend from targeted attacks, threat actors have been responding by changing their strategy,” said Mark Lechtik, senior security researcher at Kaspersky’s Global Research and Analysis Team. “We see more and more covert campaigns such as TunnelSnake, where actors take additional steps to remain under the radar for as long as possible, and invest in their toolsets, making them more tailored, complex and harder to detect. At the same time, as seen by our discovery, highly covert tools can also be spotted and stopped. This is an ongoing race between security vendors and threat actors, and to win it, we as a cybersecurity community need to continue to work together.”

