In one case, an attack resulted in a temporary shutdown of the industrial process due to servers used to control the industrial process becoming encrypted, said researchers at Kaspersky ICS CERT.
In the assault, attackers exploited the CVE-2018-13379 vulnerability to gain access to the enterprise’s network. The vulnerability was used to extract the session file of the Fortigate VPN Gateway. The session file contains valuable information, such as the username and plaintext password.
Test Connections
Several days before the start of the main attack phase, the attackers performed test connections to the VPN Gateway, apparently in order to check the vulnerable version of the software was on the device, Kopeytsev said in the report.
The attackers may have identified the vulnerable device themselves by scanning IP addresses. Alternatively, they may have bought a ready-made list containing IP addresses of vulnerable Fortigate VPN Gateway devices, Kopeytsev said in the report. In autumn 2020, an offer to buy a database of such devices appeared on a dark web forum.
After gaining access to the first system on the enterprise network, the attackers downloaded the Mimikatz utility to that system, Kopeytsev said in the report. The utility ended up used to steal the account credentials of Windows users who had previously logged in to the compromised system.
With the help of the Mimikatz utility, the attackers were able to compromise the domain administrator account, after which they started distributing malware to other systems on the organization’s network. They used the Cobalt Strike framework for that purpose.
The Cobalt Strike module loaded on attacked systems using the PowerShell. After launching, the malicious PowerShell script decrypted the payload, which provided attackers with remote control of the infected system.
Attackers Download Script
After gaining control of the infected system, the attackers downloaded a cmd script to the machine. The script was designed to download and launch the Cring ransomware.
After being installed on the system, the cmd script named execute.bat executed, Kopeytsev said in the report. The script launched PowerShell under the name “Kaspersky.” The attackers used this technique to mask the traces of the malware activity and disguise the operation of the malware as that of security solutions.
A command to download a file from the internet was passed to the running PowerShell shell. The file’s URL was http://45.67.231[.]128/ip.txt. The downloaded file was saved as C:\__output.
Although the file specified in the URL had the extension .txt, it was in fact the executable file of the malware – the Cring ransomware, Kopeytsev said in the report. At the time of analyzing the malware hosting server, the file ip.txt had already been removed, but the attackers had uploaded a newer version of the Cring malware (the file NoNet.txt) to the server.
To be able to encrypt database files and remove backup copies, the Cring malware stopped the services of the following programs:
- Veritas NetBackup: BMR Boot Service, NetBackup BMR MTFTP Service
- Microsoft SQL server: SQLTELEMETRY, SQLTELEMETRY$ECWDB2, SQLWriter
Attack Details
Various details of the attack indicate the attackers had carefully analyzed the infrastructure of the attacked organization and prepared their own infrastructure and toolset based on the information collected at the reconnaissance stage.
An analysis of the attackers’ activity demonstrated based on the results of reconnaissance performed on the attacked organization’s network, they chose to encrypt those servers the loss of which the attackers believed would cause the greatest damage to the enterprise’s operations.
It is worth highlighting a number of reasons that contributed to the information security incident investigated by the Kaspersky ICS CERT team or directly led to it.
The primary causes of the incident include the use of an outdated and vulnerable firmware version on the Fortigate VPN server (version 6.0.2 was used at the time of the attack), which enabled the attackers to exploit the CVE-2018-13379 vulnerability and gain access to the enterprise network, Kopeytsev said in the report.
The lack of timely antivirus database updates for the security solution used on attacked systems also played a key role, preventing the solution from detecting and blocking the threat. It should also be noted some components of the antivirus solution were disabled, further reducing the quality of protection.
Contributing Attack Factors
Other factors contributing to the incident’s development included the user account privilege settings configured in domain policies and the parameters of RDP access.
There were no restrictions on access to different systems. In other words, all users were allowed to access all systems. Such settings help attackers to distribute malware on the enterprise network much more quickly, since successfully compromising just one user account provides them with access to numerous systems.
The following are Kaspersky recommendations:
- Update the software of the SSL VPN Gateway to the latest versions
- Update antimalware solutions to the latest versions
- Always keep antimalware databases updated to the latest versions
- Make sure all modules of antimalware solutions are always enabled
- Change the active directory policy: Allow users to log in only to those systems required by their operational needs
- Restrict VPN access between facilities, close all ports not required by operational needs
- Configure the backup system to store backup copies on a dedicated server
- Store at least three backup copies for each critical system
- Store at least one backup copy of each server on a dedicated, standalone storage medium, such as a hard drive
- Verify the integrity of backup copies on a regular basis
Click here for more information on the report.


