Ransomware attacks have been found in 14 of the 16 U.S. critical infrastructure sectors over the past year and global cybersecurity officials want to increase everyone’s level of awareness.

With that in mind, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) highlighting the global increase in sophisticated, high-impact, ransomware incidents against critical infrastructure organizations in 2021.

Officials discovered attacks that occurred in the Defense Industrial Base, Emergency Services, Food and Agriculture, Government Facilities, and Information Technology sectors.

The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) observed continued ransomware targeting of Australian critical infrastructure entities, including in the Healthcare and Medical, Financial Services and Markets, Higher Education and Research, and Energy sectors. The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK) recognizes ransomware as the biggest cyber threat facing the United Kingdom. Education is one of the top UK sectors targeted by ransomware actors, but the NCSC-UK has also seen attacks targeting businesses, charities, the legal profession, and public services in the Local Government and Health sectors.

Ransomware tactics and techniques continued to evolve in 2021, which demonstrates ransomware threat actors’ growing technological sophistication and an increased ransomware threat to organizations globally.

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This joint Cybersecurity Advisory – authored by cybersecurity authorities in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom – provides observed behaviors and trends as well as mitigation recommendations to help network defenders reduce their risk of compromise by ransomware.

Cybersecurity authorities in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom observed the following behaviors and trends among cyber criminals in 2021:

  • Gaining access to networks via phishing, stolen Remote Desktop Protocols (RDP) credentials or brute force, and exploiting vulnerabilities.
  • Phishing emails, RDP exploitation, and exploitation of software vulnerabilities remained the top three initial infection vectors for ransomware incidents in 2021.
  • Using cybercriminal services-for-hire. The market for ransomware became increasingly “professional” in 2021, and the criminal business model of ransomware is now well established. In addition to their increased use of ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), ransomware threat actors employed independent services to negotiate payments, assist victims with making payments, and arbitrate payment disputes between themselves and other cyber criminals.
  • Sharing victim information. Eurasian ransomware groups have shared victim information with each other, diversifying the threat to targeted organizations. For example, after announcing its shutdown, the BlackMatter ransomware group transferred its existing victims to infrastructure owned by another group, known as Lockbit 2.0. In October 2021, Conti ransomware actors began selling access to victims’ networks, enabling follow-on attacks by other cyber threat actors.

Shifting away from “big-game” hunting in the United States. In the first half of 2021, cybersecurity authorities in the United States and Australia observed ransomware threat actors targeting “big game” organizations – i.e., perceived high-value organizations and/or those that provide critical services – in several high-profile incidents. These victims included Colonial Pipeline Company, JBS Foods, and Kaseya Limited. However, ransomware groups suffered disruptions from U.S. authorities in mid-2021. Subsequently, the FBI observed some ransomware threat actors redirecting ransomware efforts away from “big-game” and toward mid-sized victims to reduce scrutiny.

Diversifying approaches to extorting money. After encrypting victim networks, ransomware threat actors increasingly used “triple extortion” by threatening to (1) publicly release stolen sensitive information, (2) disrupt the victim’s Internet access, and/or (3) inform the victim’s partners, shareholders, or suppliers about the incident.

Cybersecurity authorities in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents:

  1. Keep all operating systems and software up to date.
  2. If you use RDP or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely.
  3. Implement a user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting suspicious websites, clicking on suspicious links, and opening suspicious attachments.
  4. Require MFA for as many services as possible
  5. Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to have strong, unique passwords.
  6. If using Linux, use a Linux security module (such as SELinux, AppArmor, or SecComp) for defense in depth.
  7. Protect cloud storage by backing up to multiple locations, requiring MFA for access, and encrypting data in the cloud.

Malicious cyber actors use system and network discovery techniques for network and system visibility and mapping. To limit an adversary’s ability to learn an organization’s enterprise environment and to move laterally, take the following actions:

  • Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between – and access to – various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
  • Deploying mutual Transport Layer Security (mTLS) can prevent eavesdropping on communications, which, in turn, can prevent cyber threat actors from gaining insights needed to advance a ransomware attack.
  • Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a network-monitoring tool.
  • Organizations should document approved solutions for remote management and maintenance.
  • Implement time-based access for privileged accounts.
  • Enforce principle of least privilege through authorization policies.
  • Enforce credential protection by restricting where accounts and credentials can be used and by use local device credential protection features.

Click here for more details on the joint advisory.

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