By Gregory Hale
Talk abounds across the manufacturing industry about the convergence of IT and OT, and with good reason. The benefits of working with, and culling the knowledge of vastly experienced IT security experts, knows no ends.
Having said that, there is another level of convergence occurring that is a bit quieter, but is just as important, if not more so, moving forward. That is the interconnection of physical and cyber security.
What used to be two different forms of security are now digitally uniting much like how hardware and software link together.
That unity needs to form because like a lion hunting a herd of antelope, a targeted attacker group will find the weakness in whatever they are going after. If that means they strike through the business enterprise or they get in through a CCTV system connected over the Internet, all they need is an entry point and then the pivot play to the manufacturing control system begins.
In the end, that calls for an increased level of visibility.
One case in point is no one would think that operating a crane at a manufacturing or a construction site would be a cybersecurity breach attack point. Operating a crane is pretty basic old school technology, right? With a shift toward a more dynamic technology, by using a simple replay attack and a digital watch using radio frequency (RF), it is possible to take control of a crane.
RF technology is being used in operations to control various industrial machines, and a lack of security in communication protocols could lead to production sabotage, system control, and unauthorized access, said Trend Micro’s senior threat researcher, Stephen Hilt, and Jonathan Andersson, manager of the advanced security research at last year’s S4x19 conference.
Physical Component to Attacks
“Without strong physical security controls and countermeasures, cybersecurity is worthless,” said Joel Langill, director of mission engineering & resilience at Amentum. “If you look at all the attacks that have occurred to date they have all had a physical attack component. Shamoon had a physical component; Stuxnet had a physical component. (In one, attackers introduced the Shamoon virus that was able to fry 35,000 hard drives at Saudi Aramco. In Stuxnet, U.S. and Israel were able to attack an air-gapped control system at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran to damage centrifuges and set the country’s nuclear program back for years.) Those attacks would have never occurred without the physical component. Most people are failing seriously because of their lack of understanding of the physical security of critical cyber assets.”
Much like safety and security work hand-in-hand, physical and cybersecurity need to understand each other.
“The physical aspect is not anywhere near where it should be,” Langill said. “There is a common key globally accessible to secure the physical asset of plants. Cabinet locks are common and not unique. You work with a vendor long enough and you can possess all the keys for all the cabinets. Basic security of making sure the cabinets are locked is not enforced at the vendor level.”
With more physical components or devices becoming more digitally enabled via increased levels of sensors, it becomes imperative to be able to see what is happening on all forms of networks, be it control, business enterprise, building automation, or the physical infrastructure.
“If I have physical access to a sensor, I don’t need to hack it,” Langill said. “I just can use a handheld communicator and I can do whatever I need to do. To get on a sensor network, I have got to be local. If I have physical access, I have access to everything.”
Protecting a Refinery
Along those lines, there was a case of a 300,00 bpd refinery about to upgrade its legacy safety systems. After a cybersecurity consultant came in to determine the area needed to be at a Security Level 3 (SL3), it became perfectly clear the greatest weakness was in the physical protection because there was literally no security on the buildings, equipment rooms, and equipment cabinets. Anyone could just roll up to the front door and cause chaos. In that case, access control was an imperative fix.
As physical security systems become more intelligent and connected, risks end up being similar to a manufacturing automation network. The best way to mitigate those risks is with current best practices: Keep them as isolated as possible digitally, do not use common credentials or access controls across systems, so there can be checks and balances for each other where one does not inadvertently become the vector of attack for the other, and also allow for increased levels of visibility. All of this requires a degree of coordination. This means those in charge of physical security, cybersecurity, and safety all need to work together, and each should consider the other disciplines when threat modeling.
“You have to go beyond security,” Langill said. “Cybersecurity tends to protect against vulnerabilities in the logical aspect of the system. It doesn’t protect against logical capabilities and how they can be exploited with simple physical access. Physical security has to be there.”
That is why a totally integrated security solution, and not segmented security through an organization, is the wave of the future. With integrated security, you have to look at risk tolerance, governance, audits and assessments, security team skills and constant security strategy evolution. Integrated security is not just physical or cyber or human or any one element, it needs to all tie in together.
The distinction between digital and physical worlds is vanishing. That means being able to visualize risks associated with connectivity accelerates the need for new security protections for all aspects of manufacturing.

