In December 2020, FireEye uncovered and publicly disclosed a widespread campaign conducted by the threat group tracked as UNC2452. In some, but not all, of the intrusions associated with this campaign where Mandiant has visibility, the attacker used their access to on-premises networks to gain unauthorized access to the victim’s Microsoft 365 environment.
UNC2452 and other threat actors used several methodologies to move laterally from on-premises networks to the cloud, specifically Microsoft 365.
As a result of the SolarWinds attack, more and more companies are either wondering if they are victims or want to protect against becoming a victim.
To that end,Mandiant is releasing an auditing script, Azure AD Investigator, through its GitHub repository that organizations can use to check their Microsoft 365 tenants for indicators of some of the techniques used by UNC2452.
The script will alert administrators and security practitioners to artifacts that may require further review to determine if they are truly malicious or part of legitimate activity. Many of the attacker techniques detailed in a white paper on the subject are dual-use in nature — they can end up used by threat actors but also by legitimate tools. Therefore, a detailed review for specific configuration parameters may be warranted, including correlating and verifying configurations align with authorized and expected activities.
Mandiant observed UNC2452 and other threat actors moving laterally to the Microsoft 365 cloud using a combination of four primary techniques:
- Steal the Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) token-signing certificate and use it to forge tokens for arbitrary users (sometimes described as Golden SAML). This would allow the attacker to authenticate into a federated resource provider (such as Microsoft 365) as any user, without the need for that user’s password or their corresponding multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanism.
- Modify or add trusted domains in Azure AD to add a new federated Identity Provider (IdP) the attacker controls. This would allow the attacker to forge tokens for arbitrary users and has been described as an Azure AD backdoor.
- Compromise the credentials of on-premises user accounts synchronized to Microsoft 365 that have high privileged directory roles, such as Global Administrator or Application Administrator.
- Backdoor an existing Microsoft 365 application by adding a new application or service principal credential in order to use the legitimate permissions assigned to the application, such as the ability to read email, send email as an arbitrary user, access user calendars, etc.

