Beckhoff Automation GmbH & Co. KG has a plan to handle denial of service attacks in its TwinCAT OPC UA Server and IPC Diagnostics UA Server versions, according to a report with CERT@VDE.

In the vulnerability, discovered by Industrial Control Security Laboratory of QI-ANXIN Technology Group Inc. from China, the attacker needs to send several specifically crafted requests to the running OPC UA server. After some of these requests, the OPC UA server is no longer responsive to any client. This is without effect to the real-time functionality of IPCs.

TwinCAT OPC UA Server (contained within TF6100 OPC UA) server versions up to and including 2.3.0.12 suffer from the issue, including within TF6100 versions up to and including 3.3.18.

IPC Diagnostics UA Server, contained in Beckhoff’s Windows images, server versions up to and including 3.1.0.1 suffer from the issue. IPC products from Beckhoff ship with an IPC Diagnostics UA Server pre-installed. In all cases the server is disabled by default.

The version numbers named above always refer to the version number which is accessible via OPC UA at the server via the standard OPC UA node /Objects/Server/ServerStatus/BuildInfo/SoftwareVersion and on Windows also as the file property “File version” of the file TcOpcUaServer.exe for TwinCAT OPC UA Server respectively the file DevMgrSvr-UA.exe for IPC Diagnostics UA Server.

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The vulnerability (CVE-2020-12526) type is an improper input validation.

An attacker who can establish a TCP connection to one of the affected OPC UA servers can send a series of specifically crafted data packets to it. By repeating this several times this will provoke a stack overflow at the OPC UA server which then stops and does not recover until restarted by an administrator.

Since TCP connections are routable, an attacker may perform the exploit from remote if there is no firewall set up which limits the access to the TCP which the OPC UA server is listening on. The attacker does not need to have a local account at the device or OPC UA server nor it any authentication required for the attack.

The availability impact within the CVSS vector, which is 5.3, has been rated low because the TwinCAT OPC UA Server and IPC Diagnostics UA Server are seen as less-essential functional parts of an Industrial PC (IPC) image, not as its core functionality. The critical functionality of the IPC is its real-time runtime. The TwinCAT OPC UA Server is a communication interface. The IPC Diagnostics UA Server is for the hardware diagnostics functionality of the IPC. The main function of the IPC remains unaffected during the attack.

In a mitigation plan, Beckhoff said to consider disabling the IPC Diagnostics Server by stopping and disabling the corresponding Windows service or service. For example this can end up achieved with the following PowerShell commands:

  • Stop-Service -Force -Name DevMgrSvr-UA
  • Set-Service -Name DevMgrSvr-UA -StartupType Disabled

Alternatively, consider limiting access to the TCP port the OPC UA server is listening on. This can happen with a dedicated firewall appliance which sits in front of an affected device. Alternatively, at the device, the Windows firewall can end up configured to limit access to the TCP port. Further guidance is provided within the “Security Guide IPC” from Beckhoff.

For devices running Windows but not Windows CE or TwinCAT/BSD download a recent version of the OPC UA servers through the conventional ways and update your system.

For devices running Windows CE, request a recent image via Beckhoff’s support and apply it to your device.

For CX8091 use firmware version “CX8091_CE600_LF_v356f_TC211R3_B2306_v2” or later.

The updated OPC UA server leaves less RAM available to your application on the CX8091.

Click here for the Beckhoff advisory.

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