By Gregory Hale
A chilling safety video launched focused on the October 26, 2019, hydrogen sulfide release at the Aghorn Operating waterflood station in Odessa, Texas, where a worker and his wife died due to exposure to the deadly gas.

The release killed an Aghorn employee who was working at the facility that evening, as well as his spouse who attempted to locate him at the facility after he did not return home.

The CSB’s safety video, entitled “Silent Killer: Hydrogen Sulfide Release in Odessa, Texas,” includes animation of the events leading up to the incident, and interviews with the CSB’s chairperson and the supervisory investigator.

“We urge companies operating oil and gas facilities to understand the findings from this investigation and implement appropriate safeguards and training,” said CSB Chairperson and Chief Executive, Dr. Katherine Lemos. “We need to work together to ensure that our workers and community members return home safely each and every day.”

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Waterflood Station
The Aghorn Operating waterflood station is used as part of a process to extract oil from underground reservoirs in West Texas. During extraction, oil comes out of the ground with water in it. The water is removed from the oil, but it can contain some residual oil and other contaminants such as the toxic hydrogen sulfide. At the Aghorn waterflood station, pumps, in a building called the “pump house,” are used to pressurize and inject the water back into the oilfield. The injected water adds pressure to the reservoir allowing a larger quantity of oil to be extracted.

On the night of the incident, the waterflood station’s control system activated an oil level alarm on a pump. An Aghorn worker drove to the waterflood station and attempted to isolate the pump from the process by closing two valves. The CSB found, however, the worker failed to isolate the pump from energy sources, called a lockout/tagout, before performing the work. At some point while the worker was in the vicinity of the pump, the pump automatically turned on, and water containing hydrogen sulfide escaped into the pump house. The pumper was overcome and fatally injured by the toxic gas.

Pump house that emitted deadly H2S gas that left a husband and wife dead.

After the incident, the CSB found a plunger on the pump shattered, which had allowed the release to occur. Due to the limitations of the available evidence, the CSB was unable to determine whether the pump failure and toxic release happened before the pumper arrived at the facility, or when the pump automatically turned on while the pumper was closing valves.

Serious Safety Issues
Supervisory Investigator Lauren Grim reviewed facts of the event, the six serious safety issues identified in the investigation, and the resulting recommendations.

Among the myriad findings in the report were the worker was not wearing his personal hydrogen sulfide detection device upon entering the facility, and there was no evidence Aghorn management required the use of these devices.

In addition, Aghorn did not maintain or properly configure its waterflood station facility hydrogen sulfide detection and alarm system. Without the alarm panel receiving signals from the detectors, neither the facility’s beacon warning light nor the phone system alerted the worker to the dangerous atmosphere.

Also, the CSB was unable to confirm whether the pump house exhaust fans were operational at the time of the incident. Aghorn did not have sufficient fixtures or facilities to ventilate the pump house and there is no evidence of Aghorn’s assessment of the facility design to ensure proper ventilation.

Recommendations
The CSB made seven recommendations to Aghorn Operating, Inc. for safety improvements at all waterflood stations where the potential exposure to dangerous levels of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas exists.

The seven recommendations include:

  1. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers or non-employees to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, mandate the use of personal H2S detection devices as an integral part of every employee or visitor personal protective equipment (PPE) kit prior to entering the vicinity of the facility. Ensure detector use is in accordance with manufacturer specifications.
  2. For all Aghorn facilities, develop a site-specific, formalized and comprehensive Lockout/Tagout program, to include policies, procedures, and training, to protect workers from energized equipment hazards, such as exposure to H2S. Ensure the program meets the requirements outlined in 29 CFR 1910.147 and includes energy control procedures, training, and periodic inspections.
  3. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, commission an independent and comprehensive analysis of each facility design vis-à-vis ventilation and mitigation systems to ensure that, in the event of an accidental release, workers are protected from exposure to toxic gas levels.
  4. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers or non-employees to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, develop and demonstrate the use of a safety management program that includes a focus on protecting workers and non-employees from H2S. This program should include risk identification, assessment, mitigation, and monitoring of design, procedures, maintenance and training related to H2S. This program must be in compliance with 29 CFR 1910.1000 – Air Contaminants and 29 CFR 1910.147 – The Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout).
  5. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, ensure the H2S detection and alarm systems are properly maintained and configured, and develop site-specific detection and alarm programs and associated procedures based on manufacturer specifications, current codes, standards, and industry good practice guidance. The program must address installation, calibration, inspection, maintenance, training and routine operations.
  6. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose workers or non-employees within the perimeter of the facility to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, ensure the H2S detection and alarm system designs employ multiple layers of alerts unique to H2S, such as with the use of both audible and visual mediums, so workers and non-employees within the perimeter of the facility would be alerted to a significant release. The system design must meet manufacturer specifications, current codes, standards, and industry good practice guidance.
  7. For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose non-employees to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, develop and implement a formal, written, site-specific security program to prevent unknown and unplanned entrance of those not employed by Aghorn, starting with a requirement for employees to lock access gates upon entering and departing the facility.

The CSB also made two recommendations to federal and state regulators, OSHA and the Railroad Commission of Texas, addressing the requirements for protecting workers from hazardous air contaminants and from hazardous energy.

“This tragic accident did not need to happen,” Lemos said. “This is a call to action for all companies, large and small, to step up to the plate to prioritize the safety of your workers and your community.”

Click here to view the video.

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