By Gregory Hale
Attackers across the globe have conducted malicious cyber activity against critical infrastructure (CI) by exploiting Internet-accessible operational technology (OT) assets.
That is why the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are recommending critical infrastructure facilities take immediate actions to secure their OT assets. While this is an ongoing state of affairs for critical infrastructure players, it remains unclear as to why the federal agencies released this now.
Also, there are companies that already have a solid security program in place, so they may say the NSA and CISA’s report has a firm grasp of the obvious. However, there are plenty of other organizations out there not fully engaged in practicing cybersecurity, so this may come as a wake-up call to start a program to ensure a productive, safe and secure manufacturing workplace.
In the world of digitization with increased connectivity, the NSA and CISA report said Internet-accessible OT assets are becoming more prevalent across critical infrastructure sectors as companies increase remote operations and monitoring, accommodate a decentralized workforce, and expand outsourcing of key skill areas such as instrumentation and control, OT asset management/maintenance, and in some cases, process operations and maintenance.
Vulnerable to Attack
Legacy OT assets not designed to defend against malicious cyber activities, combined with readily available information that identifies OT assets connected via the Internet are creating a “perfect storm” of:
1) Easy access to unsecured assets
2) Use of common, open-source information about devices
3) An extensive list of exploits deployable via common exploit frameworks
Observed cyber threat activities can end up mapped to the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) for Industrial Controls Systems (ICS) framework.
The following are some of observed tactics, techniques, and procedures pointed out by CISA and the NSA:
- Spearphishing to obtain initial access to the organization’s information technology (IT) network before pivoting to the OT network
- Deployment of commodity ransomware to Encrypt Data for Impact on both networks
- Connecting to Internet Accessible PLCs requiring no authentication for initial access
- Utilizing Commonly Used Ports and Standard Application Layer Protocols, to communicate with controllers and download modified control logic
- Use of vendor engineering software and Program Downloads
- Modifying Control Logic and Parameters on PLCs
The impact of these moves, could lead to a loss of availability on the OT network, a partial loss of view for human operators, which could lead to a loss of productivity and revenue, and adversary manipulation of control and disruption to physical processes.
Ukraine Attack
Since the Ukraine cyberattack of 2015, organizations must assume in their planning of not only a malfunctioning or inoperative control system, but a control system that is actively acting contrary to the safe and reliable operation of the process, the NSA and CISA report went on to say.
Therefore, organizations need an OT resilience plan that allows them to:
- Immediately disconnect systems from the Internet that do not need Internet connectivity for safe and reliable operations. Ensure compensating controls are in place where connectivity cannot be removed.
- Plan for continued manual process operations should the ICS become unavailable or need to be deactivated due to hostile takeover.
- Remove additional functionality that could induce risk and attack surface area.
- Identify system and operational dependencies.
- Restore OT devices and services in a timely manner. Assign roles and responsibilities for OT network and device restoration.
- Backup “gold copy” resources, such as firmware, software, ladder logic, service contracts, product licenses, product keys, and configuration information. Verify that all “gold copy” resources are stored off-network and store at least one copy in a locked tamperproof environment.
- Test and validate data backups and processes in the event of data loss due to malicious cyber activity.
Incident Response Plan
In a state of heightened tensions and additional risk and exposure, it is critical to have a well-exercised incident response plan that is developed before an incident.
In addition, the NSA and CISA report said to create an accurate “as-operated” OT network map immediately because an accurate and detailed OT infrastructure map provides the foundation for sustainable cyber-risk reduction. User should:
- Document and validate an accurate “as-operated” OT network map
- Create an asset inventory
- Identify all communication protocols used across the OT networks
- Investigate all unauthorized OT communications
- Catalog all external connections to and from the OT networks
In reviewing the document, John Cusimano, vice president of cybersecurity at aeSolutions noted in a LinkedIn post a few items worth pointing out. One was, “‘Create an Accurate ‘As-operated’ OT Network Map Immediately.’ The use of the term ‘As-operated’ is key,” he said. “Also, the use of the term ‘immediately’ is eye-catching! This does need to be done first, even before the risk assessment because, of course, you can’t assess the risk if you don’t know what you have or how it is interconnected. Most companies we work with recognize that they need to develop ICS asset inventories and network diagrams but are so daunted by the task that they never get to it unless we do it on their behalf as part of a CyberPHA project. People keep searching for the ‘holy grail’ of software tools that will automate this with the push of a button. We will get there someday but today most of the products in this space fall short and the time, effort and cost to deploy them just continue to delay getting the job done. There are ways to semi-automate the development of asset Inventory and network diagrams using the data that is available through Windows, network device configurations, packet captures, ICS engineering tools, and other tools you may already have in your environment such as AD, and network monitoring software.”
Andrea Carcano, Nozomi Networks co-Founder and chief product officer sees some good that already has happened throughout the industry.
“While this alert raises serious concerns about the growing threat to critical infrastructure, the good news is that many industry-leading critical infrastructure organizations are already aggressively defending their systems, having taken early steps to leveraging innovative network visibility and security solutions for better protection,” Carcano said.
Risk Awareness
The report went on to say users need to understand and evaluate cyber-risk on “as-operated” OT assets because informed risk awareness can end up developed using a variety of readily available resources, many of which include specific guidance and mitigations. Users should:
- Use the validated asset inventory to investigate and determine specific risk(s) associated with existing OT devices and OT system software
- Implement mitigations for each relevant known vulnerability, whenever possible
- Audit and identify all OT network services (e.g., system discovery, alerts, reports, timings, synchronization, command, and control) that are in use
“The ‘mitigations’ they provided are sound, practical advice,” Cusimano said. “One that really caught my attention was ‘understand and evaluate cyber-risk on ‘as-operated’ OT assets.’ The term ‘as-operated’ is the key part of that statement. Too often I’ve seen companies assess risk by completing a NIST CSF, C2M2, CSET or other ‘gap assessment.’ These are not risk assessments and they are usually very broad brush. To truly understand your current ICS cybersecurity risk you need to perform a detailed risk assessment per ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 on specific systems.”
On top of everything, the report continued, a vigilant monitoring program enables system anomaly detection, including malicious cyber tactics like “living off the land” techniques within OT systems.
Click here for the complete NSA and CISA report.

