Editor’s Note: Faced with designing and implementing both a safety instrumented system (SIS) and a basic process control system (BPCS), project team leaders must assess their goals and choose how the two systems will form an architecture to securely deliver the process engineering, safety, and operation capabilities required.
Top of mind for these decision makers is how to create and maintain a defendable environment for each system that will also bring efficiencies to the overall project and allow the systems to operate effectively and sustain security for years to come.
This three-part article series presents the three most common approaches to SIS and BPCS interaction for distributed control system applications.
By Sergio Diaz and Alexandre Peixoto
Part 3
Creating a well-designed and secure architecture for the safety instrumented system (SIS) and basic process control system (BPCS) sits at the heart of keeping people, assets, the environment, and organizations safe. Once the systems are in place, process and culture play a key role in maintaining safe operations because when operations can be more simply accomplished, safety is strengthened.
While the BPCS and SIS can be integrated, they must still be functionally separated for purposes of independent operation. In other words, the SIS must be always be available to operate even if the BPCS fails to keep the process within safe limits. Integration does not mean common hardware but an effective method to transfer information.
Of the three SIS architecture approaches for distributed control systems (DCS) – separate, interfaced, and integrated – the integrated approach promotes streamlined operations and maintenance and therefore creates a strong and secure environment. The integrated approach provides flexibility to accommodate different operational practices. For example, configuration changes could be done from a common workstation, or if desired, SIS configuration could be restricted to dedicated SIS workstations. Alarms from BPCS and SIS could be displayed together or in dedicated screens. On an integrated system, setting the right approach for presenting data requires less effort than on an interfaced system.
In the long term, the integrated control and safety system (ICSS) approach provides benefits beyond time and cost savings by increasing operational efficiencies across the facility. Figure 1 shows the tasks common to the SIS and the BPCS in the integrated environment.

Figure 1. Tasks that can be shared between the SIS and BPCS making operations much simpler and streamlined. Tasks also include alarm/event monitoring, bypass management, and management of change.
Well-Used Expertise and Resources
Industry best practices are that SIS personnel are fully trained to perform their duties on the safety system. Ideally, facilities have separate resources to work on the BPCS and SIS; however, the reality is in some cases when the same personnel perform both functions, they should be qualified for handling both. Some organizations have the same instrument technicians maintain both SIS and DCS sensors and final safety or control elements. In some industries or facilities, operators can interact with both systems too – monitoring both the process and safety systems in a central control room. Often, the system administrators (persons maintaining backups, user accounts, patch management, etc.) are the same for both DCS and SIS regardless of if DCS and SIS are integrated, interfaced, or isolated from each other. The exception to this trend has been the control engineer responsible for the DCS configuration and the safety engineer having responsibility for the safety system, but this has been in part because the safety system has been an older, isolated system that requires the engineer to be specifically trained on its configuration and use.
With a modern ICSS, the same engineer can be trained once on the configuration and use of both the process control and safety functions of the integrated system. While independent reviews should still be in place in accordance with best engineering practices, integration facilitates a better use of scarce resources. With many experienced workers retiring or nearing retirement, organizations are looking to the younger, less experienced engineers now entering the process industry workforce to be trained on handling both the BPCS and SIS configuration in an organization. For large organizations, centralizing expertise is a goal to allow a single engineer or team to maintain multiple systems across different sites that span the country, or even the globe.
Seamless Process Interface
The integrated approach allows the BPCS and SIS to easily share workstations, requiring a secure, robust plant-wide network designed to ensure process and equipment information is available wherever it’s needed. If, for example, a process alarm, safety alarm, process event, or safety event occurs, an operator at any workstation will see the issue and can begin to address it quickly and accurately.
While safety functions typically do not require operator intervention (the SIS will automatically take the plant to a safe state), there are still benefits for having common operator workstation. A single operator can monitor consolidated alarms and events to facilitate coordination during an abnormal situation. For example, in certain processes (e.g. boilers), the process control and the safety application (Burner Management System) are very interrelated and combining both in the same console facilitates operation and response to an abnormal situation. Integration can also increase the operational awareness and decision support for the operator. The indication of a gas detector can be visible to all operators rather than just the safety personnel. Having the SIS data easily visible does not mean lack of separation of function. All operators can view the SIS data for increased awareness, but only the personnel with the appropriate privileges can interact with the SIS via secure mechanisms. Operator actions to the SIS should include mechanisms to reduce the risk of sending invalid or corrupt messages as well as verification that messages indeed reach the safety systems. These types of mechanisms are normally a built-in feature on integrated systems – rather than an engineered solution for interfaced systems.
Streamlined Process Changes and Cybersecurity Updates
While project teams always recognize the importance of a properly-functioning SIS, they sometimes incorrectly assume that once the SIS is initially configured and installed, it will be capable of functioning for the lifecycle of the equipment, with no need to ever make changes and adjustments. The reality is, things change – even the SIS. Over the lifetime of the plant, the SIS will likely have to undergo changes should the process be changed, improved or the site expanded. The ICSS needs to be updated in terms of software versions. On a properly designed ICSS, the BPCS and SIS can be upgraded independently and accommodate different schedules. The SIS needs to be periodically proof tested and an integrated architecture facilitates the proof testing process.
Because personnel do not need to manage two sets of defense-in-depth architectures for two separate systems, time is saved in security change management and in downtime. In a properly designed ICSS, some layers of protection are common and some layers of protection are specific to the SIS – increasing its overall protection. Cybersecurity updates such as operating system patches or antivirus signature updates can be automatically performed without external or difficult-to-regulate communication methods that could jeopardize the cybersecurity of the SIS. Since cybersecurity updates apply to both systems and both are updated at the same time, conflicts between the two systems security are avoided entirely.
Integrated Diagnostics
Diagnostics are common to the BPCS and the SIS and are, therefore, more familiar to the operators and engineers working on both systems. The more personnel are familiar with the process and the systems operating it, the faster they will be able to address safety or reliability issues, improve production, and achieve high-integrity process availability.
Security Around Bypasses Impacts Safety
Bypasses on a safety system are necessary for maintenance purposes. While the process and paperwork for bypass approval is typically done outside the SIS, the SIS still needs to be able to properly manage those bypasses. The system needs to have a way to allow or prohibit bypasses. Personnel need to be able to set the bypass and have notifications regarding how many bypasses there are and for how long those bypasses have been in place.
The SIS should be able to handle bypass permits, preventing multiple bypasses on the same safety function, and automatically removing bypasses if necessary. In addition to the protections provided at the SIS level, it also helpful to provide visibility of active bypasses. With an integrated safety system, bypass notifications are easily accessible on the ICSS workstations without the need to configure or modify the interface to the BPCS (e.g. Modbus mapping). Multiple users can be notified in the event of a bypass being set and even receive a notification in a mobile device.
Simpler Management of User Privileges
Older standalone safety systems may have simplified user management – if you have a user account you can configure or make online changes to the safety system. Or worse still, singular reliance on a physical key being in the correct position – otherwise any user can make a change.
A modern ICSS will have a consolidated user management system that allows you to flexibly assign the least amount of privileges the technician, engineer, or maintenance person needs to perform their assigned role with respect to both the control and safety system.
Defense-in-Depth of a Modern Integrated Control and Safety System
Defense-in-depth of a modern ICSS has complementary features to more easily and fully secure the entire solution:
- Reduced entry points to the SIS because it is defended by the DCS and behind a proxy or gateway
- Single set of cybersecurity protections to manage for both the DCS and SIS
- Security features requiring physical presence to make configuration and online changes
— Two-factor user authentication
— Physical key switch on logic solvers to lock out changes
— Physical bypass switch - Single Operator Interface for:
— Process and safety: alarm and event management
— Integrated bypass management - Integrated diagnostics
- User permissions with a least privilege approach
Click here for additional information.
Sergio Diaz is product manager for safety systems at Emerson and Alexandre Peixoto, is product marketing manager for cybersecurity at Emerson.
