The mere thought of ransomware striking a manufacturing facility will keep plant managers and security professionals tossing and turning at night. Along those lines, a new ransomware, called EKANS, which is SNAKE backwards, is making inroads into the manufacturing industry, researchers said.
As a ransomware sample, in terms of encrypting files and displaying a ransom note, EKANS featured additional functionality to forcibly stop a number of processes, including multiple items related to industrial control system (ICS) operations, according to a report from Dragos.
While all indications at present show a relatively primitive attack mechanism on control system networks, the specificity of processes listed in a static “kill list” shows a level of intentionality previously absent from ransomware targeting the industrial space, said researchers at Dragos.
ICS asset owners and operators should review their attack surface and determine mechanisms to deliver and distribute disruptive malware, such as ransomware, with ICS-specific characteristics.
Upon discovery and investigation, Dragos identified a relationship between EKANS and ransomware called MEGACORTEX, which also contained some ICS-specific characteristics.
EKANS underscores the importance for asset owners and operators to achieve visibility into their assets, researchers said. By taking stock of available assets and connections within an environment, asset owners can understand the potential consequences of an adversary deploying ICS-specific ransomware against a certain asset, the impact to operations or related processes, and take measures to defend against them.
With a limited set of ICS-specific malware in existence, EKANS, though primitive, represents an evolution in adversaries targeting control system environments, researchers said.
EKANS is an obfuscated ransomware variant written in the Go programming language, first observed in commercial malware repositories in late December 2019.
Past concerns with ransomware in ICS environments focused on propagation mechanisms. Essentially, IT-focused ransomware could impact control system environments if they could migrate into Windows-based portions of control system networks, thus disrupting operations. As such, any ICS disruption caused by ransomware represented the results of overly-aggressive malware propagation leading to ICS impacts.
EKANS (and apparently some versions of MEGACORTEX) shift this narrative as ICS-specific functionality is directly referenced within the malware. While some of these processes may reside in typical enterprise IT networks, such as Proficy servers or Microsoft SQL servers, inclusion of HMI software, historian clients, and additional items indicates some minimal, albeit crude, awareness of control system environment processes and functionality.
The actual level of impact EKANS or ICS-aware MEGACORTEX may have on industrial environments is unclear. Targeting historian and data gathering processes at both the client and server level imposes significant costs on an organization and could induce a loss of view condition within the overall plant environment. The impacts for licensing server and HMI process termination are less clear, as other processes may still be in play to enable functionality and fallbacks or “grace periods” for licensing servers may enable continued operations for some time absent the license management system.
EKANS ransomware is unique as it joins a handful of ICS-specific malware variants, such as Havex and CRASHOVERRIDE, in having specific references to industrial processes, Dragos said. At the same time, EKANS actual implementation of such functionality is extremely primitive with an indeterminate industrial impact.
EKANS malware and its attempt to cease particular industrial-related processes is further evolution and context around the growing cyber threat to industrial control systems, but EKANS itself is more a novelty than a discrete and worrying risk, Dragos said.
Nonetheless, EKANS (and its likely predecessor MEGACORTEX) represent an adversary evolution to hold control system environments specifically at risk. As such, EKANS despite its limited functionality and nature represents a relatively new and deeply concerning evolution in ICS-targeting malware.
Whereas previously ICS-specific or ICS-related malware was solely the playground of state-sponsored entities, EKANS appears to indicate non-state elements pursuing financial gain are now involved in this space as well, even if only at a very primitive level.
It is incumbent upon ICS asset owners and operators to learn from not only how EKANS itself functions, but the myriad ways in which malicious software like EKANS can propagate and be distributed in control system environments to prepare actionable, relevant defense.
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