In fact, if all indications are true about a nation state attack, this could be the classic case of while everyone is looking and protecting against an attack from one side, the attacker strikes from another. Case in point, and this may seem out there, but while the U.S. was worried about and focusing on election security, a clever attacker, knowing you never strike the same place twice, decided to get information an entirely different way.
That line of thought could end up inferred from an advisory released from the came from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) saying it is aware of compromises of U.S. government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations by an APT actor beginning at least this past March.
“This APT actor has demonstrated patience, operational security, and complex tradecraft in these intrusions,” the CISA said in its advisory. “CISA expects that removing this threat actor from compromised environments will be highly complex and challenging for organizations.”
One of the initial access vectors for this activity is a supply chain compromise of the following SolarWinds Orion products:
- Orion Platform 2019.4 HF5, version 2019.4.5200.9083
- Orion Platform 2020.2 RC1, version 2020.2.100.12219
- Orion Platform 2020.2 RC2, version 2020.2.5200.12394
- Orion Platform 2020.2, 2020.2 HF1, version 2020.2.5300.12432
Other than SolarWinds, CISA has evidence of additional initial access vectors, which are still under investigation.
In a first step to mitigate the compromise, CISA ordered on December 13 federal civilian executive branch departments and agencies to disconnect affected devices.
CISA determined this threat “poses a grave risk to the Federal Government and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as critical infrastructure entities and other private sector organizations.”
CISA officials offered its key takeaways in the ongoing compromise:
- This is a patient, well-resourced, and focused adversary that has sustained long duration activity on victim networks.
- The SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise is not the only initial infection vector this APT actor leveraged.
- Not all organizations that have the backdoor delivered through SolarWinds Orion have been targeted by the adversary with follow-on actions.
- Organizations with suspected compromises need to be highly conscious of operational security, including when engaging in incident response activities and planning and implementing remediation plans.
Compromises by an APT actor began at least as early as this past March and hit U.S. government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and private sector organizations. This threat actor has demonstrated sophistication and complex tradecraft in these intrusions. CISA expects that removing the threat actor from compromised environments will be highly complex and challenging. This adversary has demonstrated an ability to exploit software supply chains and shown significant knowledge of Windows networks. It is likely the adversary has additional initial access vectors and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have not yet been discovered.
CISA is investigating incidents that exhibit adversary TTPs consistent with this activity, including some where victims either do not leverage SolarWinds Orion or where SolarWinds Orion was present but where there was no SolarWinds exploitation activity observed. Volexity has also reported publicly that they observed the APT using a secret key the APT previously stole in order to generate a cookie to bypass the Duo multi-factor authentication protecting access to Outlook Web App (OWA). Volexity attributes this intrusion to the same activity as the SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise, and the TTPs are consistent between the two. This observation indicates there are other initial access vectors beyond SolarWinds Orion, and there may still be others not yet known.
Orion Compromise
SolarWinds Orion is an enterprise network management software suite that includes performance and application monitoring and network configuration management along with several different types of analyzing tools. SolarWinds Orion monitors and manages on-premise and hosted infrastructures. To provide SolarWinds Orion with the necessary visibility into this diverse set of technologies, it is common for network administrators to configure SolarWinds Orion with pervasive privileges, making it a valuable target.
The threat actor has been observed leveraging a software supply chain compromise of SolarWinds Orion products. The adversary added a malicious version of the binary solarwinds.orion.core.businesslayer.dll into the SolarWinds software lifecycle, which was then signed by the legitimate SolarWinds code signing certificate. This binary, once installed, calls out to a victim-specific avsvmcloud[.]com domain using a protocol designed to mimic legitimate SolarWinds protocol traffic. After the initial check-in, the adversary can use the Domain Name System (DNS) response to selectively send back new domains or IP addresses for interactive command and control (C2) traffic. Consequently, entities that observe traffic from their SolarWinds Orion devices to avsvmcloud[.]com should not immediately conclude the adversary leveraged the SolarWinds Orion backdoor. Instead, additional investigation is needed into whether the SolarWinds Orion device engaged in further unexplained communications. If additional Canonical Name record (CNAME) resolutions associated with the avsvmcloud[.]com domain are observed, possible additional adversary action leveraging the back door has occurred.
Based on coordinated actions by multiple private sector partners, as of December 15, avsvmcloud[.]com resolves to 20.140.0[.]1, which is an IP address on the Microsoft blocklist. This negates any future use of the implants and would have caused communications with this domain to cease. In the case of infections where the attacker has already moved C2 past the initial beacon, infection will likely continue notwithstanding this action.
SolarWinds Orion typically leverages a significant number of highly privileged accounts and access to perform normal business functions. Successful compromise of one of these systems can therefore enable further action and privileges in any environment where these accounts are trusted.
Obfuscation
The adversary is making extensive use of obfuscation to hide their C2 communications. The adversary is using virtual private servers (VPSs), often with IP addresses in the home country of the victim, for most communications to hide their activity among legitimate user traffic. The attackers also frequently rotate their “last mile” IP addresses to different endpoints to obscure their activity and avoid detection.
FireEye reported the adversary is using steganography (Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography to obscure C2 communications. This technique negates many common defensive capabilities in detecting the activity.
According to FireEye, the malware also checks for a list of hard-coded IPv4 and IPv6 addresses — including RFC-reserved IPv4 and IPv6 IP — in an attempt to detect if the malware is executed in an analysis environment (e.g., a malware analysis sandbox); if so, the malware will stop further execution. Additionally, FireEye analysis identified the backdoor implemented time threshold checks to ensure there are unpredictable delays between C2 communication attempts, further frustrating traditional network-based analysis.
While not a full anti-forensic technique, the adversary is heavily leveraging compromised or spoofed tokens for accounts for lateral movement. This will frustrate commonly used detection techniques in many environments. Since valid, but unauthorized, security tokens and accounts are utilized, detecting this activity will require the maturity to identify actions that are outside of a user’s normal duties. For example, it is unlikely that an account associated with the HR department would need to access the cyber threat intelligence database.
Taken together, these observed techniques indicate an adversary who is skilled, stealthy with operational security, and is willing to expend significant resources to maintain covert presence.
The adversary has been observed using multiple persistence mechanisms across a variety of intrusions. CISA has observed the threat actor adding authentication tokens and credentials to highly privileged Active Directory domain accounts as a persistence and escalation mechanism. In many instances, the tokens enable access to both on-premise and hosted resources. Microsoft released a query that can help detect this activity.
Microsoft reported the actor has added new federation trusts to existing infrastructure, a technique that CISA believes was utilized by a threat actor in an incident to which CISA has responded. Where this technique is used, it is possible that authentication can occur outside of an organization’s known infrastructure and may not be visible to the legitimate system owner. Microsoft has released a query to help identify this activity.
Compromising SAML
The adversary’s initial objectives, as understood today, appear to be to collect information from victim environments. One of the principal ways the adversary is accomplishing this objective is by compromising the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) signing certificate using their escalated Active Directory privileges. Once this is accomplished, the adversary creates unauthorized but valid tokens and presents them to services that trust SAML tokens from the environment. These tokens can then access resources in hosted environments, such as email, for data exfiltration via authorized application programming interfaces (APIs).
CISA has observed in its incident response work adversaries targeting email accounts belonging to key personnel, including IT and incident response personnel.
These are some key functions and systems that commonly use SAML:
- Hosted email services
- Hosted business intelligence applications
- Travel systems
- Timecard systems
- File storage services (such as SharePoint)
Network of IP Addresses
The adversary is using a complex network of IP addresses to obscure their activity, which can result in a detection opportunity referred to as “impossible travel.” Impossible travel occurs when a user logs in from multiple IP addresses a significant geographic distance apart.
The following conditions may indicate adversary activity:
- Most organizations have SAML tokens with 1-hour validity periods. Long SAML token validity durations, such as 24 hours, could be unusual.
- The SAML token contains different timestamps, including the time issued and the last time used. A token having the same timestamp for when it was issued and when it was used is not indicative of normal user behavior as users tend to use the token within a few seconds but not at the exact same time of issuance.
- A token that does not have an associated login with its user account within an hour of the token being generated also warrants investigation.
Due to the nature of this pattern of adversary activity — and the targeting of key personnel, incident response staff, and IT email accounts — discussion of findings and mitigations should be considered very sensitive, and should be protected by operational security measures. An operational security plan needs to be developed and communicated to ensure all staff are aware of the applicable handling caveats.
Operational security plans should include:
- Out-of-band communications guidance for staff and leadership
- An outline of what “normal business” is acceptable to be conducted on the suspect network
- A call tree for critical contacts and decision making
- Considerations for external communications to stakeholders and media
CISA said the attacker used the following ATT&CK techniques:
- Query Registry
- Obfuscated Files or Information
- Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography
- Process Discovery
- Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
- Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- Application Layer Protocol: DNS
- File and Directory Discovery
- Ingress Tool Transfer
- Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
- Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- Software Discovery
- Software Discovery: Security Software
- Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms
- System Services: Service Execution
- Compromise Infrastructure
Mitigations
Owners of vulnerable SolarWinds Orion products will generally fall into one of three categories:
Category 1 includes those who do not have the identified malicious binary. These owners can patch their systems and resume use as determined by and consistent with their internal risk evaluations.
Category 2 includes those who have identified the presence of the malicious binary — with or without beaconing to avsvmcloud[.]com. Owners with malicious binary whose vulnerable appliances only unexplained external communications are with avsvmcloud[.]com — a fact that can be verified by comprehensive network monitoring for the device — can harden the device, re-install the updated software from a verified software supply chain, and resume use as determined by and consistent with a thorough risk evaluation.
Category 3 includes those with the binary beaconing to avsvmcloud[.]com and secondary C2 activity to a separate domain or IP address. If you observed communications with avsvmcloud[.]com that appear to suddenly cease prior to December 14 — not due to an action taken by your network defenders — you fall into this category. Assume the environment has been compromised, and initiate incident response procedures immediately.
If the adversary has compromised administrative level credentials in an environment – or if organizations identify SAML abuse in the environment – simply mitigating individual issues, systems, servers, or specific user accounts will likely not lead to the adversary’s removal from the network. In such cases, organizations should consider the entire identity trust store as compromised. In the event of a total identity compromise, a full reconstitution of identity and trust services is required to successfully remediate. In this reconstitution, it bears repeating this threat actor is among the most capable, and in many cases, a full rebuild of the environment is the safest action.
Click here for more information on the CISA advisory.

