There is an ongoing malicious cyber activity by known and unknown attackers targeting the information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks, systems, and devices of U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector facilities, federal officials said.

To help users in that sector, CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA).

This activity, which includes cyber intrusions leading to ransomware attacks, threatens the ability of water and wastewater facilities to provide clean, potable water to, and effectively manage the wastewater of, their communities. The joint CSA provides mitigations and resources to assist water and wastewater facilities to strengthen its resilience and cybersecurity practices.

Water and wastewater facilities may be vulnerable to the following common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors to compromise IT and OT networks, systems, and devices.

  1. Spearphishing personnel to deliver malicious payloads, including ransomware
  2. Exploitation of unsupported or outdated operating systems and software
  3. Exploitation of control system devices with vulnerable firmware versions

Cyber intrusions targeting water and wastewater facilities highlight vulnerabilities associated with the following threats: Insider threats, from current or former employees who maintain improperly active credentials, and ransomware attacks.

Schneider Bold

Water and wastewater facilities cyber intrusions from 2019 to early 2021 include:

  • In August 2021, malicious cyber actors used Ghost variant ransomware against a California-based water and wastewater facilities facility. The ransomware variant had been in the system for about a month and was discovered when three supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) servers displayed a ransomware message.
  • In July 2021, cyber actors used remote access to introduce ZuCaNo ransomware onto a Maine-based water and wastewater facilities facility’s wastewater SCADA computer. The treatment system was run manually until the SCADA computer was restored using local control and more frequent operator rounds.
  • In March 2021, cyber actors used an unknown ransomware variant against a Nevada-based water and wastewater facilities facility. The ransomware affected the victim’s SCADA system and backup systems. The SCADA system provides visibility and monitoring but is not a full industrial control system (ICS).
  • In September 2020, personnel at a New Jersey-based water and wastewater facilities facility discovered potential Makop ransomware had compromised files within their system.
  • In March 2019, a former employee at Kansas-based water and wastewater facilities facility unsuccessfully attempted to threaten drinking water safety by using his user credentials, which had not been revoked at the time of his resignation, to remotely access a facility computer.

Personnel responsible for monitoring water and wastewater should check for the following suspicious activities and indicators:
Inability of water and wastewater facility personnel to access SCADA system controls at any time, either entirely or in part

Unfamiliar data windows or system alerts appearing on SCADA system controls and facility data screens that could indicate a ransomware attack

Detection by SCADA system controls, or by water treatment personnel, of abnormal operating parameters, such as unusually high chemical addition rates, used in the safe and proper treatment of drinking water

Access of SCADA systems by unauthorized individuals or groups, e.g., former employees and current employees not authorized/assigned to operate SCADA systems and controls

Access of SCADA systems at unusual times, which may indicate that a legitimate user’s credentials have been compromised

Unexplained SCADA system restarts

Unchanging parameter values that normally fluctuate

The increased use of remote operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic increased the necessity for asset owner-operators to assess the risk associated with enhanced remote access to ensure it falls within acceptable levels.

Users should also require multi-factor authentication for all remote access to the OT network, including from the IT network and external networks. They should also utilize blocklisting and allowlisting to limit remote access to users with a verified business and/or operational need. In addition, they should ensure all remote access technologies have logging enabled and regularly audit these logs to identify instances of unauthorized access. They should also utilize manual start and stop features in place of always activated unattended access to reduce the time remote access services are running. In addition, they should audit networks for systems using remote access services. And, when configuring access control for a host, utilize custom settings to limit the access a remote party can attempt to acquire.

Click here for more information on the joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA).

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