By Gregory Hale
EDITOR’S NOTE: This is part one of a series of stories on the high profile incidents hitting the manufacturing automation sector and what some industry experts have to say. This week, we look at the growth of ransomware attacks.

There is no doubt highly publicized ransomware attacks over the past few weeks like Colonial Pipeline JBS, and Fujifilm, all point out the need for heightened security, and awareness. However, with some companies deciding to pay the ransom, it may have made security professionals’ lives that much more difficult.

While that is not a judgement on why or whether a company should pay the ransom, it simply points out attackers will likely feel emboldened to the idea they can hold a company for hostage by encrypting their system and then exfiltrating data they can release to the public if the victim decides not to pay.

“Ransomware is clearly a profitable business model and just like smart business people, smart criminals go to where the profits are,” said Eric Byres, chief executive at aDolus, a software bill of materials (SBoMs) provider for the ICS/OT sector. “Expect to see more attacks, not less, until defensive solutions and the risk of getting caught exceeds the profit potential of these multi-million dollar ransoms.”

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Double Hit to an Attack
“Ransomware attacks of a few years ago typically demanded a few hundred dollars and the focus was encrypting specific computers, often personal computers,” Byres said. “As the Colonial Pipeline attack showed, the ransoms are now in the range of $5 million dollars and locking down the entire company was the attackers’ objective. Similarly, the meat processing company JBS reportedly paid an $11 million ransom to the attackers. Ransomware operators no longer just encrypt systems – they also exfiltrate confidential company data so even if the company can recover from backups, the attackers have a second big threat to force the payment of the ransom.”

As Byres said, ransomware has been around but it has evolved into a bigger, more all-encompassing enterprise.

“Ransomware became more public as the criminals behind it went from targeting individuals to targeting hospitals, large companies and hitting the supply chains that cause massive downstream effects,” said Dewan Chowdhury, chief executive and founder of security provider, malcrawler. “With the targeting of large enterprises, cyber attackers are using techniques that nation-state attackers use for stealing data. They go in stealth to understand the IT infrastructure and then implement their ransomware to cause the most disruption. Just imagine the thousands of companies that get compromised with ransomware that we don’t hear of. Within those victims of ransomware, there are Fortune 1000 companies and other publicly traded companies. No publicly traded company wants to be in the spotlight of being a victim of a ransomware cyberattack. These companies think about their reputation and stock price, and there’s a reason why these criminals continue to target large enterprises because many of them pay. I remember hearing an FBI agent briefing private industry back in 2016 on ransomware, and he flat out told the audience that if you cannot recover, pay the ransom. The criminals are equal opportunity players targeting everything and anything that can give them the maximum payout.”

That also means, while security professionals always say, don’t pay the ransom, the idea of shelling out money to avoid a lengthy recovery period can be appealing.

To Pay or Not to Pay
“Companies are unfortunately realizing that paying a ransom of a few million dollars is a rounding error compared to the cost of being shut down for days,” Byres said. “So, paying the ransom, while repugnant, is often the ‘least-worse’ decision available to a company. There is no consensus among industry experts today whether companies should or should not pay.”

Case in point was JBS and Colonial decided to pay, but Fujifilm decided not to pay. The difference is Colonial’s and JBS’ networks were back up and running in a matter of days, compared to Fujifilm, which took quite over two weeks to get fully back on line. While the federal government helped get back a good portion of Colonial’s payment, that rarely happens.

One silver lining for a ransomware attack is it appears the bad guys are solely looking for a profitable pay out and not looking to destroy a facility.

“The reality is that operators shouldn’t expect that paying the ransom and getting the decryption keys will give you 100 percent recovery,” Byres said. “It will be more like 70 percent recovery. The bad guys aren’t trying to destroy the facility, but they also aren’t trying to run a managed shutdown procedure on your plant. They are just ‘pulling-the-plug’ on your facility. As we all know, many IT and OT assets don’t recover easily from that sort of sudden shutdown – that is why companies spend millions of dollars on uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) for key assets. Before they get attacked by ransomware, companies need to ask themselves, ‘how would we recover from something like a catastrophic power failure where 100 percent of our UPS failed instantly?’

Chowdhury wonders just who the attackers are.

False Flag Operation
“Some uniqueness in the malware code shows similarity to nation-state malware,” he said. “It’s hard to 100 percent say what the motive is. Can there be a false flag operation? Or, do we see coders moonlighting one day for the nation-state and the next day for their own personal wealth? To shut down a plant, though, there could be much more devastating cyberattacks that can cause long-term consequences.”

While ransomware attacks have been at the top of the news, there are other attacks hitting the industry that warrant attention.

“The other ‘growth industry’ in cyberattacks are software supply chain attacks, like the attack we saw with SolarWinds,” Byres said. “According to the report 2020 State of the Software Supply Chain, supply chain attacks surged in 2020, up 430 percent in 12 months. Supply chain attacks give attackers incredible ‘Return-on-Investment’ because they just need to penetrate one supplier and then get access inside the systems of hundreds (or thousands) of other companies. Expect to see software supply chain attacks and ransomware attacks merging in the next year to create ‘super-ransomware’ attacks where attackers can demand payment from hundreds of victim companies simultaneously.”
Next: What are possible points of entry and what can those in the industry do to prevent incidents.

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