By Gregory Hale
Even before the Oldsmar, Florida, water treatment plant suffered an attack in February, a hacker was easily able to get in to a San Francisco Bay Area water treatment facility in mid-January and delete programs used to treat drinking water, a senior intelligence official said Thursday.

The hacker used a former plant employee’s username and password to gain entry to the unidentified Bay Area water treatment facility Jan. 15, according to a NBC News report.

Confirming the attack, Michael Sena, executive director of the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center – which works with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI to track suspicious activity – declined to say where it occurred or who carried it out.

Sena also declined to say whether the hacker would face criminal prosecution.

Schneider Bold

Before anyone gets into a panic after hearing one report say the hacker “tried to poison” the Bay Area water supply, Sena came out and said that was not the case.

“No one tried to poison any of our water,” he said in a San Francisco Chronicle report. “That is not accurate.”

Tampering with the computer programs used to treat drinking water would be unlikely to result in any widespread poisoning, Sena said.

“It takes a lot to influence a water supply chain,” he said. “For a large impact, there has to be a large change in the chemicals in the system. The amount of chemicals it would take to cause harm to people … the numbers are astronomical.”

The Jan. 15 hack represented “no specific threat to public safety,” Sena said.

This incident occurred at least three weeks before the February 5 attack on the city of Oldsmar, Florida’s water supply, where someone remotely accessed a computer for the city’s water treatment system and briefly increased the amount of sodium hydroxide, or lye, by a factor of more than 100, from 100 parts per million to 11,100 parts per million.

Thanks to an operator who witnessed the attack going on, he was able to quickly change the setting back to 100 parts per million.

Sodium hydroxide is used in small amounts to control the acidity of water but it’s also a corrosive compound commonly found in household cleaning supplies such as liquid drain cleaners. Contact with sodium hydroxide can kill skin and cause hair loss, according to the National Center for Biotechnology Information. Ingestion can be fatal.

“The water treatment infrastructure in the United States is particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks,” said Mark Carrigan, senior vice president with Hexagon PPM. “Many of these facilities are run by non-profit organizations with tight budgets, without the means to implement effective cyber defense strategies. Of particular concern is the fact that many sites provide remote access for their employees, which is required to operate the facility, but do not have effective security controls on this access. Several recent attacks on water treatment facilities have exploited this weakness. The impact of a successful attack is grave, including the potential to poison people who rely upon the tap for drinking water.”

To address this risk Carrigan recommended a national strategy to improve the cyber defense of these critical assets including:

  • The U.S. government should create financial incentives to allow these underfunded enterprises to improve cybersecurity. This may include tax credits, grants, and other means that will allow them to invest in security. Without these incentives, many of the non-profit organizations will not have the means to implement cyber security best practices.
  • Water treatment facilities should immediately implement two-factor authentication mechanisms for remote access. This is a relatively inexpensive measure that can dramatically reduce the risk of infiltration.

Chris Grove, technology evangelist at security provider, Nozomi Networks, said yes, this is important news, but don’t get caught up in the fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD).

“While it’s important to keep an eye on major events, we should also avoid over sensationalized headlines intended to spread fear,” Grove said. “Even the facility operator pointed this out: There was not an attempt at poisoning the water supply.

“That said, this is a stark reminder on how insecure our nation’s water facilities are. The circumstances surrounding this event show a lack of two-factor authentication, password procedures, monitoring, and other defenses. There are many facilities that are in the same situation – same remote access woes, same password problems, and the same underfunded, understaffed cybersecurity defenders.

“By securing remote access, and monitoring for anomalies in key processes, security teams can quickly identify unusual activity – such as abnormally high number of remote connections, the use of unusual protocols in those connections, and atypical behavior of the remote user — before operations are actually disrupted,” Grove said.

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