A fatality occurred on the “Genesis” platform, operated by Chevron U.S.A. in the Gulf of Mexico when a slickline operator and slickline helper mistakenly picked up the wrong well hatch cover which led to the helper slipping through the newly exposed hole and falling 90 feet to his death on a lower deck.

Chevron contracted Quality Energy Services (QES) to perform slickline operations on designated Genesis wellbores, according to a report from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). The slickline operations took place at night in order to accommodate for other operations during the day. QES routinely performed work at the Genesis facility.

On May 13, 2019, a four-person QES crew, along with a Sparrows Crane Operator, arrived on the Genesis facility. The crew was called out to the facility to fix casing/tubing communication issues and to install gas lift valves on the A-14 Well, according to the BSEE report. From May 13 to May 31, the crew worked from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. every night on the A-14 Well. On May 31, 2019, the slickline operation on the A-14 Well successfully completed. The QES crew planned to perform slickline operations on the A-4 Well next. They began to rig down equipment on the A-14 Well and move equipment to the A-4 Well. Meanwhile, one QES crewmember ended up going ashore for a possible health concern, so another worker, who ended up being the victim, went out to the Genesis facility as a replacement, arriving on the morning of June 1.

When their shift began on the evening of June 1, QES personnel participated in a safety discussion pertaining to the future operations of moving and rigging up the riser and slickline equipment to the A-4 Wellbore, according to the BSEE report. Once they moved and installed the riser, the QES crew took a break while scaffolding was built around the A-4 Well Hatch. After the break, the crew discussed their next task was to rig up the slickline equipment. While not specifically covered in the pre-shift safety discussions or the pre-job tailgate discussion, two QES employees decided to re-install the hatch cover over the A-14 Well Hatch.

The QES workers intended to pick up and move the A-14 Hatch Cover, which they did not realize at the time was beside the Well Bay Area on the Drilling Deck. Instead, they mistakenly picked up a hatch cover from inside the Well Bay Area covering the A-13 Well Hatch. While moving this hatch cover, one QES employee stepped into the newly exposed hole and fell approximately 90 feet to a lower deck, suffering fatal injuries.

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The BSEE investigation of the June 1 incident concluded this event occurred due to the following probable causes: Lack of situational awareness while picking up the hatch cover; no physical barrier installed to prevent the removal of the hatch covers; performing activities outside the scope of work without an effective hazard analysis, and lack of clear labeling to indicate hatch cover to hatch placement.

View of a deck on a Gulf of Mexico facility that resulted in a fatality.
Source: BSEE


The investigation concluded the contributing causes of the incident were a lack of adequate written job procedures and the well hatch design. Additionally, the BSEE investigation identified a lack of job task focus as a contributing factor.

As a result of the investigation, the BSEE made the following recommendations to strengthen implementation of existing safety and environmental management systems:

  • Incorporate a facility-specific detailed procedure for the removal and installation of well hatch covers, as well as for the storage of well hatch covers when removed from the well hatch.
  • Incorporate a general lifting procedure requirement to maintain a complete visual of walking path when lifting and transporting objects. Incorporate a “Don’t step where you can’t see” requirement.
  • Incorporate at least one physical barrier for removal of the hatch covers such as a lock- out/ tag-out safety program and/or additional hatch cover weight to prevent maneuverability by personal without mechanical assistance.
  • Ensure all hatch covers are clearly labeled with the corresponding well identification, and:
    — Ensure labels are installed on the deck that correspond to the hatch cover labels
    — Maintain consistent terminology for all well hatch locations in documents and diagrams
  • Ensure employees receive practical training in the removal and installation of well hatch covers, as well as for the storage of well hatch covers when removed from the well hatch.
  • When removing or installing a well hatch cover, consider using a crane or other material handling method that limits the potential for personnel to be close to open holes.
  • Ensure contractor personnel are specifically familiarized to the area where they will work and are aware of any existing or potential open hole hazards that could be created.
  • Encourage personnel to stop work and evaluate hazards with all personnel involved in the job safety analysis (JSA) before considering activities outside the scope of work.
  • Incorporate a hatch cover design that allows personnel to clearly identify a hatch cover in a well hatch, as opposed to one laying on the deck.

Click here for more information on the incident.

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